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Unreasonable and Imperfect: Constitutionality of the
Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act's Limit on
Recovery
Mark Johnson was a robust and healthy 38-year-old mechanic
when he sought corrective treatment for a foot abnormality.
1
During his procedure, doctors accidentally cut a tendon and
severed an artery in Johnson's leg. Doctors repaired the tendon, but
did not realize that oxygen-supplying blood was no longer flowing
into Johnson's foot. When the error was finally discovered, a
vascular surgeon attempted to repair the artery but failed. Johnson
watched as his foot blackened, the tissue dying from oxygen loss.
Doctors finally informed him that his lower leg would have to be
amputated. Despite using a prosthetic leg, Johnson was no longer
able to work under cars, control a clutch, or even drive small
automobiles.
A $460,000 check, the award amount remaining after legal fees
and a statutorily imposed cap that limited his medical malpractice
damages, did little to ease Johnson's worries. In consideration of
his $50,000 salary, Johnson had asked for $1.4 million in damages.
Frustrated, he finally sought treatment from a psychiatrist and
began taking antidepressants. Johnson is a resident of California
and is subject to the State's $250,000 statutory cap on
noneconomic damages.
2
Could the same scenario happen in Louisiana? With damages
in excess of a statutory cap, could a seriously injured victim face
an arbitrary limit? The State of Louisiana similarly limits a
plaintiff's recovery in a medical malpractice action against a health
care provider. Part I of this Comment sets out the history of
Louisiana's limitation on liability and discusses the recent
constitutional controversy over this statute. Part II argues that the
general damages cap is unconstitutional under the Louisiana
Constitution, utilizing analysis of the Equal Protection and Access
to Courts Clauses. Finally, Part III compares several states'
solutions to the constitutionality issue, discussing indicators for
wages and inflation.
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1. A Bitter Remedy in Medical Malpractice; Courts: Painful Litigation
Rarely Satisfies Either the Patient or the Doctor, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 28,
2000, at Al. Facts of an actual medical malpractice case taken from newspaper
series on medical malpractice reform in California.
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).
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I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACT'S LIMITATION ON LIABILITY
In the mid-1970s, the Louisiana legislature faced several
difficult decisions concerning the liability of the State's health care
providers. Across the nation state legislatures were concerned with
excessive damage awards and rising medical malpractice insurance
costs. 3 Along with almost every other state, Louisiana passed a
statute in response to "the medical malpractice crisis. ' 4 The
problem was actually two-fold: issues of availability and
affordability.5
The crisis of availability was specifically linked to the exit of
major medical malpractice insurance providers who experienced
significant losses during the early 1970s. 6 This insurance exit trend
was a major concern for doctors; in a 1975 national survey, doctors
in sixteen states reported "difficulty" in obtaining coverage that
they considered a precondition to their individual practices. 7
In addition to issues regarding availability, the Louisiana
legislature was also concerned that the skyrocketing costs would
price many health care providers out of the remaining market.
Doctors and insurance companies reported that, depending on a
doctor's individual area of practice, the price of some medical
malpractice insurance premiums increased as much as 500%.8
Several states, including Louisiana, adopted policies consistent
with the theory that "[t]he most direct way to alleviate insurance
cost pressures on medical practitioners is by statutes designed to
limit the amount of damages recoverable in a medical malpractice
action." 9 Proponents of such statutes argued that jury awards were
one of the major reasons for premium increases, considering that
3. DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, Damage Caps-In
General, in 3 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 18.15 (LexisNexis 2008) (1960).
4. Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. St. Univ., 446 So. 2d 760, 765 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 462 So. 2d 149 (La.), affd in part, rev'd in part on
reh'g, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985), on remand, 490 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1986).
5. M. Roy Schwarz, Liability Crisis: The Physicians' Viewpoint, in
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-TORT REFORM 16, 17 (James E. Hamner III & B.R.
Jennings eds., 1987). See generally MICHELLE M. MELLO, UNDERSTANDING
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRIMER 6 (2006), http://www.rwjf org/
pr/synthesis/reports and briefs/pdf/no 1 0_primer.pdf.
6. Id.
7. PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 85 (1985).
8. Id. at 97.
9. STEVEN E. PEGALIS, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 297
(3d ed. 2005).
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juries were more likely to irrationally overcompensate malpractice
victims with awards for noneconomic damages, such as pain and
suffering. '
0
A. The Louisiana Statute, Revised Statutes Section 40:1299.42
The Louisiana State Legislature passed Act No. 817 on July 14,
1975,11 and the Governor signed the act on August 4.12 The act
codified in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42,1
amended the Revised Statutes by adding a new part concerning
medical malpractice. 14 Subsection B of the statute provides: "The
total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries to
or death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and related
benefits as provided in Revised Statutes section 1299.43, shall not
exceed five hundred thousand dollars plus interest and cost."'15
The details of Louisiana's medical malpractice statute,
including the application of the liability cap, are best explained by
examining the process by which a victim brings a potential claim.
Initially, a potential plaintiff must submit the claim to a medical
review panel.1 6 That claim must be brought against a qualified
healthcare provider. 17 First, the panel considers all evidence in the
10. Kevin J. Gfell, Comment, The Constitutional and Economic
Implications of a National Cap on Non-Economic Damages in Medical
Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REv. 773, 779 (2004).
11. H.B. 1465, Reg. Sess. (La. 1975).
12. 1975 La. Acts No. 817 (codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41-
1299.49 (2008)).
13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(1) (2008).
14. 1975 La. Acts No. 817.
15. § 40:1299.42(B)(1).
16. § 40:1299.47(A)(1).
17. § 40:1299.41 (A)(1), defining "health care provider" as:
a person, partnership, limited liability partnership, limited liability
company, corporation, facility, or institution licensed or certified by
this state to provide health care or professional services as a physician,
hospital, nursing home, community blood center, tissue bank, dentist,
registered or licensed practical nurse or certified nurse assistant,
offshore health service provider, ambulance service under
circumstances in which the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.39 are not
applicable, certified registered nurse anesthetist, nurse midwife,
licensed midwife, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor,
physical therapist, occupational therapist, psychologist, social worker,
licensed professional counselor, licensed perfusionist, or any nonprofit
facility considered tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3), Internal
Revenue Code, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), for the diagnosis and
treatment of cancer or cancer-related diseases, whether or not such a
facility is required to be licensed by this state, or any professional
corporation a health care provider is authorized to form under the
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case 18 including all medical information and the affidavits and
testimony of expert witnesses. 19 The panel then issues its opinion
on whether the defendant qualified health care provider acted or
failed to act within the appropriate standard of care.20 The potential
plaintiff can then choose-depending on the favorable or
unfavorable opinion of the panel-to take his issue to trial.
If the plaintiff takes his complaint to court and the court rules
in his favor, the qualified health care provider is personally liable
for damages up to $100,000.21 If the plaintiffs award is in excess
of that amount, the remainder, up to $500,000, is paid from the
Patient's Compensation Fund (PCF).22 The PCF is a custodial fund
held by the state to pay medical malpractice claimants. 2 3 Qualified
health care providers annually pay into the PCF in accordance with
rates determined by the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission.
24
The limitation on liability in section 40:1299.42 is an absolute
cap on a victim's recovery such that all damages, other than future
medical costs, cannot exceed $500,000. Future medical expenses
are not subject to the cap. 25
The principal purpose of enacting the Medical Malpractice Act
was to limit health care providers' liability and to provide
compensation to medical malpractice victims. 26 Limitations on
liability were generally believed to yield a decrease in medical
malpractice frequency and severity, as well as a decrease in costs
provisions of Title 12 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, or any
partnership, limited liability partnership, limited liability company,
management company, or corporation whose business is conducted
principally by health care providers, or an officer, employee, partner,
member, shareholder, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of
his employment.
18. § 40:1299.47(D)(1).
19. § 40:1299.47(D)(2).
20. § 40:1299.47(G).
21. § 40:1299.42(B)(2).
22. § 40:1299.42(B)(3)(a). See also § 40:1299.44.
23. § 40:1299.44(A)(1).
24. See § 40:1299.44(A)(2).
25. FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, Health Care Providers-
An Overview § 21.03[5], in LOUISIANA TORT LAW 21-22 (2d ed. 2004) (stating
that future medical expenses include all medical expenses, but the finder of fact
determines which medical expenses are considered necessary). See also Sarah R.
Levin, Comment, The Medical Malpractice System and the Payment of Future
Medical Damages: On Life Support Elsewhere, Resuscitated in Louisiana, 68
LA. L. REv. 955 (2008) (explaining the payment of medical damages to victims
of medical malpractice through the Louisiana patient's compensation fund).
26. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. EUSEA, 775 So. 2d 32, 36 (La. App.
1st Cir. 2000), writ denied, 791 So. 2d 116 (La. 2001).
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to healthcare providers, to provide for health care insurance
available at reasonable rates, and finally to ensure medical
malpractice victims prompt adjudication and reasonable
recovery.27 In an editorial supporting the statute's passage, the
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate cited to the burgeoning costs of
malpractice insurance as a principal reason for the limitation on
liability.28 The legislation, according to the editorial, was
comparable to measures in Indiana, California, Florida, and
Alabama.29 Most importantly, the article billed the limitation on
recovery as "adequate" but conceded that "in future years this
amount could be upped if inflation continues and the costs of
living keeps going up."
30
B. The Current Controversy and the Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal recently
considered two cases concerning the constitutionality of the cap.3
Both cases are significant because they indicate a willingness on
the part of courts to consider economic arguments in favor of
finding the limitation on liability unconstitutional.32 The cases are
also examples of circumstances likely to reoccur, indicating that
not only has this been a prior issue for the courts, but also that it
will continue to arise.
On October 28, 1994, William Arrington died at the Lake Area
Medical Center in Lake Charles, Louisiana.33 His doctor, Richard
Samudia, was found to have committed malpractice in connection
with Arrington's death.34 The Medical Malpractice Act limited Dr.
Samudia's personal liability to $100,000. 3 On August 15, 2000,
27. LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 3.
28. Editorial, Malpractice Bill Is Sensible Solution, THE ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge), June 19, 1975, at A22.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, 940 So. 2d 777, 779 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2006), vacated, 947 So. 2d 724 (La. 2007); Taylor v. Clement, 940 So. 2d
796, 797 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 947 So. 2d 721 (La. 2007).
32. See Arrington, 940 So. 2d at 784 ("The trial judge found that because of
the depreciation of the dollar, the $500,000.00 cap imposed in 1975 is worth
only about $160,000.00 today. That conclusion is supported by the evidence.
The defendant argues that the passage of time, the devaluation of the dollar, and
other relevant economic factors are irrelevant in determining whether an
adequate remedy in law exists. We disagree." (emphasis by the court)).
33. Id. at 779.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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the plaintiffs also settled the related claim a6ainst the Louisiana
Patient's Compensation Fund for $500,000. Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal,
seeking to have the limitation on liability in section 40:1299.42
declared unconstitutional.37
At the same time, another challenge to the medical malpractice
cap was moving through the court system. On June 22, 2001, a
trial court awarded Charles and Sharon Taylor damages in excess
of the statutory limit in a medical malpractice claim.3 The Taylors
appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal, seeking
to have the limitations on their recovery imposed by the Medical
Malpractice Act declared unconstitutional. 39 Despite differences in
the cases' assignments of error, the main premise of the suits was
the same: the unconstitutionality of the damages cap. As such, the
third circuit joined the two cases and certified a question to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana for instructions on the following
question of law:4
0
Considering the devaluation of the dollar in the thirty years
since the passage of the medical malpractice act is such that
the $500,000.00 limit imposed in 1975 is now, according to
competent evidence, worth only $160,000.00, and considering
that Section 22 of Article I of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974 provides Louisiana citizens with an "adequate remedy"
under our law, is the limitation on recovery for general
damages of $500, 000. 00 imposed by the Louisiana Medical
Malpractice Act, [Louisiana Revised Statutes section]
40:1299.41, et seq., still considered constitutional?41
The supreme court denied certification of the question on June
17, 2005, and remanded the case to the third circuit.42 Undeterred
in both cases, the third circuit held that the Medical Malpractice
Act's limitation on liability was unconstitutional, 43 stating: "In
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Taylor v. Clement, 940 So. 2d 796, 797 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006), rev'd,
947 So. 2d 721 (La. 2007).
39. Id.
40. Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, 897 So. 2d 911, 913 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 904 So. 2d 708 (La. 2005). See also Taylor v. Clement, 897
So. 2d 909, 911 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 904 So. 2d 708 (La. 2005).
41. Taylor, 897 So. 2d at 911 (emphasis added).
42. Arrington, 904 So. 2d 708; Taylor, 904 So. 2d 708.
43. Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, 940 So. 2d 777, 784 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2006), rev'd, 947 So. 2d 724 (La. 2007). See also LA. CONST. art. I, § 22
(stating "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate
remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial,
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either case, we find the current $500,000.00 cap fails to provide an
adequate remedy to today's severely injured plaintiffs and thus, is
unconstitutional under the provisions of [Louisiana Constitution
article 1, section 22]."44
Both cases went back to the supreme court for consideration of
the third circuit's determination of unconstitutionality. The court
vacated the Arrington and Taylor judgments on procedural
grounds, stating:45 "It is well-established that litigants must raise
constitutional challenges in the trial court rather than in the
appellate courts, and that the constitutional challenge must be
specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim particularized.
46
Despite this procedural issue and the supreme court's hesitance
to look at the constitutionality question anew, the Louisiana
Medical Malpractice Act's limitation on liability is
unconstitutional under the Louisiana State Constitution, article 1,
sections 3 and 22. Policy considerations also demand that the state
re-examine the malpractice cap. Under the provisions of the
limitation, Louisiana residents will not receive adequate
compensation for injuries caused by medical malpractice if the
damages exceed $500,000. Additionally, as the dollar value of the
cap continues to fall, the utility of tort damages as a deterrent to
medical malpractice will also fall.47 Considering Louisiana's
substantial interest in this area of regulation, the state should
amend the liability cap to allow for an inflation multiplier that will
keep pace with real prices and medical expenses. An inflation
multiplier would not only provide a slight increase in the cap each
year, but it would also provide a real connection between actual
economic conditions and the value of the cap. Such a multiplier
allows the cap to adequately provide compensation in accordance
with real dollar values.
partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property,
reputation, or other rights"); Taylor v. Clement, 940 So. 2d 796, 798 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 947 So. 2d 721 (La. 2007).
44. Arrington, 940 So. 2d at 784; Taylor, 940 So. 2d at 798.
45. Arrington v. Galen-Med, Inc., 947 So. 2d 719, 719 (La. 2007). See also
Taylor v. Clement, 947 So. 2d 721, 722 (La. 2007).
46. Arrington, 947 So. 2d at 720.
47. DANZON, supra note 7, at 3 (stating "that if the tort system is to be
evaluated on grounds of economic efficiency, then it can be justified, if at all,
only by its performance in deterring negligent behavior").
2009] 423
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT'S
LIMITATION ON LIABILITY
The Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of the cap in several cases.48 Challenges to the statute asserted
constitutional questions under article 1, sections 3 and 22, the
Equal Protection and Access to Courts Clauses.
A. Article I, Section 3: The Equal Protection Clause
The Louisiana State Constitution's Equal Protection clause
provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
No law shall discriminate against a person because of race
or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or affiliations. 49
The equal protection analysis in previous challenges focused
on two aspects of section 3: the arbitrariness, capriciousness, or
unreasonableness of the cap and the discrimination inherent in
classifying medical malpractice victims.
1. The Limitation as Arbitrary, Capricious, or Unreasonable
The major case to dispense with the argument that the cap was
arbitrary is Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hospital.5" The Butler court
concluded that "the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act represents
a reasonable but imperfect balance between the rights of victims
and those of health care providers. It does not violate the state...
constitution." 5' Acknowledging the medical malpractice insurance
crisis and the legislature's intent to respond to the crisis, the
supreme court affirmed lower court jurisprudence that the
limitation on liability does not involve fundamental rights.52
The court upheld the cap's reasonableness, and the Medical
Malpractice Act in general, on three grounds. First, the structure of
the act is such that it increases the likelihood that physicians or
48. Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So. 2d 517 (La.
1992); Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989).
49. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
50. Butler, 607 So. 2d at 521.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id.
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other health care providers will have malpractice insurance.
53
Second, victims have a greater assurance of collecting from a
solvent fund under the structure of the Patient's Compensation
Fund.54 Finally, the court stated that the act provides for the
payment of all medical care and related benefits.55
The Louisiana Supreme Court's quick rejection of the
constitutional argument lacks a complete analysis of the statute's
provisions for certain medical malpractice victims. Despite the
arguments that qualified health care providers are more likely to
carry malpractice insurance and the Patient's Compensation Fund
provides a solvent source of damages, the limitation on liability
does not provide payment of all medical care and benefits.
As noted in the facts of Taylor v. Clement,56 a plaintiff who
receives a verdict in excess of the statutory cap may not recover
damages above the $500,000 limit. Instead of providing recovery
of complete medical costs, expenses, and damages, the statutory
cap arbitrarily cuts off a plaintiffs recovery in the statutorily set
area of general damages. A hypothetical plaintiff could prove lost
wages alone above the statutory cap and not recover the full extent
of that loss or additional damages for claims such as pain and
suffering. As the real dollar value of the cap decreases over time
due to inflation and cost considerations, the limitation is likely to
severely restrict victims' compensation. Not only does the strict
limitation set an arbitrary thirty-two-year-old limit on recovery, but
the cap will grow more and more unreasonable as its real value
decreases.
Other cases indicate the unreasonableness of the cap. The
Louisiana limitation on liability is a general damages cap; it is
intended to put a ceiling on all damages, save those for future
medical expenses.5 7 As such, damages like lost wages are included
within the limitation. In Arrington, the family's economic loss
alone was valued at over $477,000. The court noted that the
figure did not account for the likely periodic increases in the
deceased's income.59 The argument that a $500,000 ceiling will
adequately cover damages is absurd. Wages, along with costs, will
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Taylor v. Clement, 940 So. 2d 796, 797 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006), rev'd,
947 So. 2d 721 (La. 2007).
57. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(1) (2008).
58. Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, 940 So. 2d 777, 783 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2006), vacated, 947 So. 2d 724 (La. 2007).
59. Id.
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continue to rise.60  The Butler analysis relied on the all-
encompassing nature of the cap; the cap indeed likely provided
reasonable recovery under costs and economic conditions in the
1970s and 1980s. Normal economic changes in price will vitiate
the rationale cited in Butler. As a firmly cemented limit on
recovery, the cap will grow more unreasonable as prices change.
Continuation of the statute as its 1975 limit makes much of the
defense offered for it in Butler obsolete.
Other state courts have utilized this line of reasoning. The
Illinois Supreme Court did so in Wright v. Central Du Page
Hospital.61 That court used similar economic reasoning to find the
state's cap arbitrary. Holding that the $500,000 limitation on
recovery in medical malpractice actions was arbitrary, the Illinois
court concluded that the classification created a special class, 62 an
additional argument discussed later in this Comment. While the
court did concede that the legislation could decide to completely
abolish a cause of action, it stated, "[w]e have consistently held
that to the extent that recovery is permitted or denied on an
60. See generally Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy
Report to the Congress, Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2004/july/testimony.htm (proposing
that inflation is a long-term monetary phenomena).
61. Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (I11. 1976).
62. Id. The term "special class" is an equal protection analysis term of art,
used to define a classification beyond what is considered an ordinary
classification. An ordinary classification groups people based on some benign or
behavioral characteristic. Examples of ordinary classifications include income
tax brackets and persons who go above the speed limit. Ordinary classifications
face rational basis scrutiny, whereby the challenged statute's "ends" must be
rationally related to that statute's "means." See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1290 (8th ed. 2004) (defining rational-basis test as the "criterion for judicial
analysis of a statute that does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause,
whereby the court will uphold a law if it bears a reasonable relationship to the
attainment of a legitimate governmental objective"). For the example of speed
limits, state and local governments promote safe driving (the end) and they
maintain that policy by enforcing speed limits (the means). Therefore,
convictions for speeding are not constitutionally infirm. A classification creating
a special class, however, faces a higher level of scrutiny because of the rights
involved. Strict scrutiny, the highest protection analysis, is reserved for suspect
classifications such as race and fundamental rights. See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1462 (8th ed. 2004) (defining strict scrutiny as the "standard
applied to suspect classifications (such as race) in equal protection analysis and
to fundamental rights (such as voting rights) in due-process analysis" and stating
that "[u]nder strict scrutiny, the state must establish that it has a compelling
interest that justifies and necessitates the law in question").
426 [Vol. 69
COMMENTS
arbitrary basis a special privilege is granted in violation of the
Illinois Constitution."
63
A Louisiana victim of medical malpractice may not recover in
excess of $500,000 (not considering future medical expenses)
despite evidence or even a jury finding that the victim is so
entitled. The decades-old limitation sets an arbitrary damages cap
which does not account for inflation or other economic indicators.
The limitation is unreasonable because, as the broader economic
market changes, the cap will fall short in providing "an adequate
remedy" for medical malpractice victims.
2. The Creation of Classes: Two Groups of Medical
Malpractice Victims
The second field of analysis under the Equal Protection clause
concerns the classification of medical malpractice victims. The
Medical Malpractice Act creates two groups: (1) victims whose
damages fall within the statutorily allowed limit; and (2) victims
whose general damages are above the $500,000 cap. The Louisiana
Supreme Court in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of LSU
specifically discussed the Medical Malpractice Act with reference
to the legislative power to limit certain actions.
64
Sibley concerned a plaintiffs challenge to the limitation on
liability as infringing on constitutional guarantees. 65 The plaintiff
asserted that the cap created classifications based on the level of
injury: seriously injured victims as opposed to those less seriously
injured. The injured party also argued that the creation of the two
classes was unreasonable and arbitrary; additionally, the
classification rested upon grounds lacking a fair and substantial
relation to the legislative intent.67 The court disagreed, finding that
the statutory limit did not create a prohibited classification under
equal protection.
68
The court also held that the limitation did not restrict a
fundamental right.69 As cited in Sibley, fundamental rights include
freedom of expression and association and the right to participate
63. Wright, 374 N.E.2d at 743.
64. 462 So. 2d 149, 157 (La.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on reh'g, 477 So.
2d 1094 (La. 1985), on remand, 490 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 154.
66. Id. at 155.
67. Id. See also supra note 62 and accompanying text for a discussion of
strict scrutiny.
68. Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 155.
69. Id.
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in the electoral process. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not
consider the right to full tort recovery to fall amongst those
fundamental rights, and generally "mere unequal treatment under a
statutory scheme is . . . not grounds for finding a statute
unconstitutional."7 1
The Sibley court concluded that the Medical Malpractice Act
was subject to a rational basis test 72 under which the classification
need only be "rationally related" to a legitimate legislative
objective.73 The court wrongly applied such a narrow definition to
the equal protection argument, however, and the plaintiffs
classification argument should be considered under a higher
intermediate level of scrutiny.
Grossly injured (and therefore more needing of compensation)
medical malpractice victims cannot receive full recovery. All other
medical malpractice victims with damages below the cap receive
full compensation. This classification is unreasonable simply
because the value of the cap has dwindled to a level that is so
unreasonably low.
A number of other jurisdictions have grappled with the
constitutional analysis appropriate to medical malpractice
limitations on liability.74 In Carson v. Maurer, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire specifically stated that the right to recover for
one's injuries is not a fundamental right.75 Instead of applying the
lower rational basis test, however, the court applied a heightened
standard of review.76 The court determined that in a medical
malpractice action "the rights involved . . . are sufficiently
important to require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be
subjected to a more rigprous judicial scrutiny than allowed under
the rational basis test."' 7 The court used the following standard-
"whether the challenged classifications are reasonable and have a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation"T-to
declare New Hampshire's medical malpractice statute
70. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court enumerated examples of additional
fundamental rights at length including: right to interstate travel, right to fairness
in the criminal process, right to fairness in procedures concerning governmental
deprivations of life, liberty or property, and right to privacy. Id.
71. Gfell, supra note 10, at 791.
72. Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 157.
73. Gfell, supra note 10, at 791.
74. See generally Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1233, 1234 (N.H. 1991);
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980), overruled by Cmty. Res. for
Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707 (N.H. 2007).
75. Carson, 424 A.2d at 830.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 831.
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unconstitutional under its equal protection analysis.7 9 The analysis
utilized, as opposed to rational basis scrutiny, required a more
substantial connection between the classification and the purpose
of the legislation.
In holding its malpractice cap unconstitutional, the North
Dakota Supreme Court also applied an intermediate standard of
review. In Arneson v. Olson, the court required "a close
correspondence between statutory classification and legislative
goals" in its analysis of the statute's constitutionality.80 The
intermediate test utilized by these jurisdictions is vitally important
to the Louisiana issue because it recognizes that, although strict
scrutiny should not apply, medical malpractice limitations must
meet some form of heightened scrutiny. These courts were willing
to show deference toward state legislatures that enacted caps while
balancing the state interest against tort victims' need for recovery.
The importance to Louisiana is to show that the cap itself is not per
se unconstitutional, but that a cap which dips so low because of
inflation becomes unreasonable for tort victims.
Judge Cooks highlighted a similar argument in his Arrington
dissent, utilizing article 1, section 3 when he stated that the
majority "'fouled up their navigation' in failing to mention" that
constitutional article. 81 Cooks stated that when the state provides
an adequate remedy to one class-presumably those medical
malpractice victims with damages below $500,000-but denies an
adequate remedy to other members of the same class based on their
physical condition, the state's justification is analyzed under
heightened scrutiny.82  Cooks's language is important-by
classifying all members of the class into one group, medical
malpractice victims, the basis of the distinction between remedies
is the level of physical disability or harm.
The application of a heightened standard requires a significant
connection between the legislation in question and the legislative
intent. In the case of Louisiana, the Medical Malpractice Act must
have such a relation to the statute's goals. As stated previously, the
purpose of this legislation was to limit health care providers'
liability and to provide compensation to medical malpractice
79. Id. at 838.
80. Janai M. Powell, Note, Challenging the Constitutionality of
Noneconomic Damage Caps: Boyd v. Bulala and the Right to a Trial By Jury,
24 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 821, 825 (1988).
81. Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, 940 So. 2d 777, 786 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2006) (Cooks, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 790.
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victims.83 As the limitation stands now, the balance between these
interests is grossly skewed in favor of protecting health care
providers, and the statute does little to compensate malpractice
victims. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated as much in the Sibley
decision, noting that:
We are not unmindful of hardships that this decision may
work upon the plaintiff, nor insensitive to the personal
tragedy suffered by Ms. Sibley. Aware that the greater
good hoped to be achieved by this statute is abstract and
remote, and that the statute's application in this case seems
harsh and immediate, we can only defer to the wisdom of
the legislature of its passage of the law and note that it is
our duty to interret and apply that law as objectively and
fairly as we can.
This line of analysis questions the purpose of general tort law.
From an economic perspective, tort law, such as medical
malpractice actions, should allocate the cost of accidents to those
in the best position to minimize those costs.85 The function of the
law, then, should be to optimize, not necessarily minimize, the
number of accidents.86 Judge Ezell detailed this argument in his
concurring opinion in the Arrington decision. In dealing with rising
insurance premiums, the states should seek to optimize negligent
acts by health care providers. 87 Ezell correctly noted that shielding
83. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. EUSEA, 775 So. 2d 32, 36 (La. App.
1 st Cir. 2000).
84. Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. St. Univ., 446 So. 2d 760, 768 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 462 So. 2d 149 (La.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
reh 'g, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985), on remand, 490 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1986).
85. DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
TORT LAW 27 (1992).
86. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 13 (1987). Optimizing the number of accidents is an
aspect of positive economic theory, whereby resources are most efficiently used.
Using the Hand Formula, the potential tortfeasor would be negligent if the
burden of precautions (B) is less than the probability of harm multiplied by the
gravity of the injury (PL). Id. at 85. Under this analysis, reducing the number of
medical accidents to zero would require physicians to take precautions that
would necessarily be greater than the probability multiplied by cost. An
extrapolation of this analysis in practice would lead to the illogical situation
where physicians would run costly precautionary tests and perform potentially
unnecessary procedures to guard against rare complications and injuries.
87. Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, 940 So. 2d 777, 785 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2006) (Ezell, J., concurring).
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providers from liability under the Medical Malpractice Act
effectively negated the deterrent effect of the tort law.3
8
The Louisiana statute effectively supports one purpose of the
legislation-protection of qualified health care providers from
rising costs-while neglecting the other-providing fair and
adequate relief to innocent medical malpractice victims. Health
care providers are given the shield incentive to become a qualified
health care provider under the language of the statute, knowing
that medical malpractice claims have a strict cap and that the
negligent provider's personal liability is limited generally to
$100,000. These providers are given little incentive to decrease the
occurrence of actual malpractice incidents because-especially
noting the decreasing real value of their liability-the statute
provides extensive protection. Judge Ezell's stinging criticism of
the statute included the fact that he could not determine a basis for
the statute other than the protection of health care providers at the
expense of seriously injured patients. 89
Additionally, there is a weak relationship between increases in
medical malpractice insurance premiums and damage awards for
medical malpractice. Strong statistical evidence actually shows that
other factors may be controlling.9" Insurers set premiums based on
several factors: the estimated payout to particular groups of
doctors, the uncertainty of that estimate, estimated expenses for the
year and predicted income, and the desired profit rate.91 Insurance
companies, like other businesses, invest funds to generate income.
Also, the general insurance market is subject to cyclical variations.
During the initial availability and affordability insurance crises of
the early 1970s, changes in the financial markets-including
underwriting and investments-contributed to the issue.92 Losses,
along with other cost considerations, contributed to the rising
premiums.
93
The Supreme Court of Texas also considered the inadequacy of
legislative evidence and history when it held that the Texas
limitation on medical malpractice damages was unconstitutional in
Lucas v. United States.94 The plaintiff in Lucas, the parent of a
child permanently paralyzed by a penicillin shot, sought
constitutional relief after being granted damages in excess of the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. MELLO, supra note 5, at 11.
91. Id. at 1.
92. DANZON, supra note 7, at 103.
93. Id. at 105. Author cites model for impact of capital, tax rates, the return
on assets, and the premium capital ratio on the fair insurance premium.
94. 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988).
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statutory limit.95 The case concerned a very similar issue to the
question certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Arrington:
whether the limitation on medical malpractice damages was
consistent with the Texas Constitution's open courts clause, article
1, section 13.96 Section 13 guarantees that "all courts shall be
open" and that plaintiffs "shall have a remedy by due course of
law."97 Holding that the limitation was unconstitutional, the Texas
Supreme Court noted legislative history which admitted that
changes in the insurance system "[m]a' or may not have an effect"
on the state's insurance rates.9  The court cited the
unreasonableness and arbitrariness of the limit as a "speculative
experiment" with insurance rates; the court concluded that a
determination of the rationality of awards was a duty of the judicial
branch, not the legislature.
99
It is reasonable to find a relationship between the insurance
industry and claim costs as a factor in the larger medical
malpractice issue, 00 but the Louisiana legislature should not rely
upon the medical malpractice cap to fix the whole problem. The
legislature and the supreme court should look to the speculative
nature of the Medical Malpractice Act, as cited to in Lucas, as
proof that capping awards will not end problems with insurance
rates. This "solution" continues to place the burden of costs
squarely on the shoulders of the most seriously injured malpractice
victims. Given the heightened scrutiny standard proposed in this
Comment, the State should look at the adequacy of the real dollar
figure provided in the cap and allow for adjustments which would
keep the cap in line with economic fluctuations.
In addition to the recent decisions by the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal in Arrington and Taylor, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also shown an
inclination that it is willing to consider the Medical Malpractice
Act's limitation on liability as unconstitutional. Citing to rulings by
the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Moody v. United National
Insurance Co. court declared that it was limited and bound by
95. Id. at 688. The plaintiffs were awarded $1,500,000 for pain and
suffering for their 14-month-old son's permanent paralysis due to a wrongfully
injected penicillin shot. The limit on civil liabilities for damages of a health care
provider for all past and future noneconomic damages was limited to $500,000
by statute. Id. at 689.
96. Id. at 687.
97. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13.
98. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691.
99. Id.
100. MELLO, supra note 5, at 11.
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those precedents 1 l-as the Louisiana Supreme Court had
previously declared the act constitutional, the Fifth Circuit felt
compelled not to disagree.
Under a heightened scrutiny standard, the low dollar value of
the cap provided in the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act does
not establish a close enough connection to both purposes of the
statute. While adequately providing for the protection of health
care providers, the unchanged statute no longer adequately protects
medical malpractice victims-forcing those grievously injured
parties to shoulder the burden of their claims.
The current limitation on liability contained in the Medical
Malpractice Act is unconstitutional under article 1, section 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution. The act violates the principles of equal
protection by creating an arbitrary and unreasonable limitation to
recovery for a growing population of medical malpractice victims.
As the cap continues to lose real dollar value, more tort victims
will be unable to receive full compensation.
B. Article 1, Section 22: The Access to Courts/Due Process
Clauses
The Louisiana State Constitution's Access to Courts clause
provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an
adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered
without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him
in his person, property, reputation or other rights."
102
Williams v. Kushner discussed the pertinence of the medical
malpractice cap in an "adequate remedy at law" argument.'0 3 After
settling with the negligent doctor for $100,000, the father of the
injured child sued to enforce a jury award of $1,829,000. 10 At the
jury trial, the plaintiff presented evidence of an extensive birth
injury that caused damage to the child's brachial plexus the nerves
beginning in the spinal cord and traveling into the arm.l15 Evidence
of the child's disability, impediments to his social and
psychological development, and factors concerning the child's
future wage loss were all presented. 10 6 The father challenged the
101. Moody v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 657 So. 2d 236, 239 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 663 So. 2d 713 (La. 1995).
102. LA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
103. Williams v. Kushner, 524 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), aft'd,
549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989).
104. Id. at 192.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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limitation imposed on the child's recovery under the Louisiana
Constitution, article 1, sections 3 and 22.107
The fourth circuit concluded that the child sustained damages
of at least $500,000 but would not affirm the jury verdict; the
damage conclusion was only a finding which allowed for the court
to consider the unconstitutionality of the statutory limit.10 8 The
court reasoned that the Access to Courts clause only ensures that
courts will remain open to provide legislatively-fashioned
remedies.' 0 9 The court essentially found that Williams was
afforded his day in court-he was not denied access to a forum in
which to present his claim for recovery. The Constitution, the court
held, provided only for an open forum for a legislative remedy.
The Williams court improperly construed the state
constitutional language too narrowly. In adhering to the strict
interpretation of "access," the court neglected to consider the rest
of the clause-that a plaintiff would receive an adequate remedy,
administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay. If
the plaintiff to a medical malpractice action is allowed access to
the courts but his judicially determined recovery is so limited as to
be inadequate, then the statutory limitation is not an open court
proceeding at all.
The "not open" argument was also utilized by Chief Justice
Dixon, in dissent, who argued that since an adequate remedy must
necessarily encompass all damages proven, the Louisiana cap is
prohibited by the state constitution.1 ° The provision of adequate
remedy must include more than a simple access to courts for the
process to be meaningful and fair.' Dixon also relied upon
Louisiana jurisprudence to conclude that the determination of
adequacy has historically been an issue for the judiciary." 12
Dixon's reading of article 1, section 22 equated adequacy with a
balancinf of the monetary award for a plaintiff and his sustainedlosses. 113
The Louisiana medical malpractice cap vitiates all the findings
from discovery proceedings and evidence presented before the
court which led to a determination that the plaintiff was entitled to
damages above the damages ceiling. Therefore, the foundation of
the constitutional challenge to the Medical Malpractice Act should
107. Id.
108. Id. at 193.
109. Id. at 196.
110. Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294, 308 (La. 1989) (Dixon, C.J.,
dissenting).
111. Id. at309.
112. Id.
113. Id.at3ll.
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be the denial of adequate remedy and the partiality shown to
negligent health care providers.
1. A Predetermined Limit on Plaintiff Recovery is a Denial of
an Adequate Remedy
One economic purpose of tort law is to internalize the costs of
accidents. 114 The legislatively created system in Louisiana tries to
achieve this goal by creating a process through which qualified
health care providers pay into a Patient's Compensation Fund and
are required to carry malpractice insurance. '5 The physicians
themselves shoulder the costs of these provisions by paying into
the system. Under the plain language of the statute and a firm line
of Louisiana jurisprudence, a plaintiff who suffers damages in
excess of the cap is left without recourse." 6 The limitation on
liability would then force those excess costs to fall outside the tort
recovery process.
Such a situation begs the question of fairness. It is
unreasonable to impose this financial burden on plaintiffs,
especially those who are most severely injured and therefore most
in need of compensation.117  Additionally, considering the
devaluation of the cap, this burden is more likely to fall upon an
increasing number of plaintiffs because damage awards will
increase with inflation while the cap will remain the same.
Inflation, or the continual increase in the price level, 118 is a virtual
certainty in the United States economy over long periods of
time.ll9 The $500,000 cap will grow even more unreasonable as
prices increase and inflation changes the value of the dollar. As
prices and wages rise, plaintiffs are more likely to receive jury
114. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 187.
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42, 1299.44 (2008).
116. Taylor v. Clement, 940 So. 2d 796, 797 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006), revd,
947 So. 2d 721 (La. 2007).The jury awarded the Taylors damages in excess of
the statutory limit, and the judge reduced that award.
117. Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980), overruled by Cmty.
Res. for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707 (N.H. 2007).
118. FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 10 (7th ed. 2004).
119. See generally AHARON YORAN, THE EFFECT OF INFLATION ON CIVIL
AND TAX LIABILITY vii (1983) (Author discusses the prevalence of provisions
accounting for inflation in the Preface, showing the pervasiveness of inflation
considerations throughout all areas of public policy.). This Comment assumes
that inflation will continue to occur in the domestic economy. Though,
theoretically, deflation is a possibility, the overall decrease in real prices and the
value of money would generally decrease the size of medical malpractice
awards leading to a situation where all damages would fall within the cap.
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awards in excess of the limitation-accounting for costs of the
victim's medical care, lost wages, pain and suffering, and general
damages.
Several jurisdictions have ruled caps unconstitutional under
this adequacy argument. 120 As previously cited, the Texas Supreme
Court made the same conclusion in Lucas v. United States, holding
that the $500,000 cap was an unconstitutional denial of open courts
and adequate remedy.' 21 The court, citing to the decisions in Smith
and Carson v. Maurer,122 agreed that an open courts constitutional
guarantee had to protect against more than abolitions on the right
to access.
123
The reasoning of other jurisdictions should also apply to
Louisiana because article 1, section 22 must provide a meaningful
access to the courts. A scenario in which a grievously injured
plaintiff could bring a case against a negligent health care provider,
prove damages in excess of the limitation, be awarded those
damages, and then not recover fully due to state statute renders the
trial worthless. True, the victim receives some compensation for
injuries, but is left with the burden of his damages above the
statutory ceiling.
Focusing on the due process provision of its constitution, the
Ohio Supreme Court also struck down the state's $200,000 general
damages cap in Morris v. Savoy. 124 The court declared the statute
unconstitutional due to the lack of a real and substantial relation
between awards above the state cap and rising medical malpractice
insurance claims, and it ruled that the limitation on liability
unreasonably and arbitrarily denied recovery.
125
A long-standing limit on plaintiff recovery renders the cap
almost valueless to the victim. The Louisiana statute allows for a
full trial proceeding-one where judge and jury make a
determination of the facts and evidence-then minimizes those
judicial conclusions by capping the plaintiff's award at a set dollar
amount which continues to fall in real value. Such a statute denies
the plaintiff access to courts by limiting his right to an adequate
recovery of proven damages.
120. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 162 (Ala. 1991);
Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991); Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988); Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089
(Fla. 1987).
121. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692.
122. Id. at 691-92.
123. Id. at 692.
124. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 771.
125. Id.
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2. A Limitation on Recovery Expressly Designed to Shield an
Industry or Class of Potential TorOfeasors Shows
Unconstitutional Partiality
Article 1, section 22 provides that justice will be administered
without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay.1 26 The limitation
on liability that was expressly designed to provide for economic
incentives in the medical malpractice insurance premium market
now shows partiality toward the health care providers and
insurance industry.
Justice Lemmon's dissent in Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hospital
highlighted the lack of evidence that awards greater than $500,000
contributed to the high cost of medical malpractice insurance
premiums. 127 Calling the legislative history and evidence
"extremely speculative," Lemmon considered the act a deprivation
of victims' rights. 128 Justice Dennis, in a separate dissent, also
questioned the causation analysis. Dennis stated that proponents
may have supported the speculative and hypothetic statutory intent,
but those parties "manifestly have failed to carry their burden of
proving that the $500,000 limitation of damages substantially
furthers this purpose in reality."' 129 A speculative end is insufficient
to support limiting the damages of Louisiana's victims of medical
malpractice.
The Arrington case similarly questioned the wisdom of the
Medical Malpractice Act, stating the statute was passed "under the
guise of the medical malpractice 'crisis' in order to make
premiums reasonable and affordable for health care providers."'
' 30
The balance that the Legislature speculatively hoped to strike now
weighs heavily in favor of heath care providers and their
insurers. 131 Despite an arguably legitimate legislative intent in
1975, expert testimony in the initial Arrington trial estimated that
decreases in the value of the $500,000 cap had eroded the
limitation to approximately $160,000, while a note by the court
stated that the real value had reached $146,435.132 As discussed
above, this economic factor is not likely to go away or change.
Despite the fact that all of the damages included in the state's
126. LA. CONST. art. I, § 22 (emphasis added).
127. Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So. 2d 517, 524
(La. 1992) (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 525 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
130. Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, 940 So. 2d 777, 780-81 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2006), vacated, 947 So. 2d 724 (La. 2007).
131. Id. at 781.
132. Id.
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general damages cap-including medical costs, wages, legal fees,
etc.-have increased and will continue to increase with inflation,
the cap has remained the same.
The changing economic conditions must tilt the balance in
favor of victims' need for compensation over health care providers'
cost concerns. From the analogy in Butler, the Medical Malpractice
Act no longer provides an imperfect balance; it provides no balance
at all. In order to adequately provide for victims, the state must
address the constitutional challenges to the cap.
Under analysis from article 1, section 3, the limitation on
liability denies medical malpractice victims equal protection by
unreasonably and arbitrarily capping damages and wrongfully
creating classes of victims. The act denies victims an adequate
remedy provided without denial or partiality, essentially denying
them due process as guaranteed by article 1, section 22. The
limitation on liability, as providing for a general and unchanging
damages cap of $500,000, should be found unconstitutional.
III. THE SOLUTION
Cases concerning the constitutionality of medical malpractice
liability limitation often cite to state or national legislative findings
discussing the effects of "the medical malpractice crisis."' 33 While
many sources cite to issues within the insurance industry, the most
commonly cited factor in rising medical costs is the impact of huge
damage awards in medical malpractice cases. 134 The real interest of
the state is indeed a delicate balance between health care
providers' availability and affordability concerns and seriously
injured victims' need for compensation. 135
This Comment takes issue with the decreasing real value of
Louisiana's limitation on liability. Devaluation itself is the reason
for the statute's unconstitutionality. A statute that accounts for
devaluation-through an economic indicator or a multiplier to
account for inflation-would not face the same constitutional fate.
133. Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So. 2d 517, 521(La. 1992); Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294, 305 (La. 1989) (Dixon, C.J.,
dissenting); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. 1988); Sibley v.
Bd. of Supervisors of La. St. Univ., 462 So. 2d 149, 152 (La. 1985); Wright v.
Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (I11. 976); Arrington, 940 So.
2d at 780-81; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Eusea, 775 So. 2d 32, 36 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 2000).
134. Richard K. Willard, The Medical Malpractice Crisis and the Need for
Tort Reform, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-TORT REFORM 5 (James E. Hammer
III & B.R. Jennings eds., 1987).
135. Schwarz, supra note 5, at 17.
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A limitation on liability that equitably balances the state's need to
protect health care providers from run-away juries and victims'
need for compensation is constitutionally sound.
The Medical Malpractice Act supplies a general damages cap
on medical malpractice damages in contrast with other states that
cap only noneconomic damages.1 6 Noneconomic damages are often
cited as compensation for "pain and suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity
for enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary damages,' ' 137 while
total damages also apply to economic losses such as lost wages and
medical costs. 138 Twenty-six states have some kind of limitation on
damages, but the statutes vary widely. 139 Only five states-
Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Virginia-have
strictly a total damage cap.' 40 Interestingly, Louisiana's total cap is
the lowest of the five.' 41 The reality of the statutory construction is
that states with only a noneconomic damages cap allow plaintiffs
to recover for all medical costs and lost wages. By limiting
virtually all damages under its statute, Louisiana is potentially
providing the lowest recovery for seriously injured victims in the
nation, a trend that, while not inherently unconstitutional, might
influence the legislature.
The option of providing compensation for all economic
damages and leaving only pain and suffering awards beneath the
cap would accomplish Louisiana's legislative purposes. Plaintiffs
would receive compensation for economic and medical damages
proved at trial; health care providers would also receive the benefit
136. CAL. CrV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
766.118(2)(b) (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.7 (LexisNexis
2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02(b) (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 11-108 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 60H (2000); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (Supp.
2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323. 43
(West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-1708.1F (West 2004); UTAH CODE
ANN. §78B-3-410 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8(a) (West Supp. 2008);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 2006).
137. Smith v. Dep't. of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987). See also
Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 158 (Ala. 1991) (defining
noneconomic damages as "losses to compensate for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium and
other nonpecuniary damage").
138. MELLO, supra note 5, at 7.
139. Id.
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (West 2001); Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, Med. Malpractice: State Med. Liab. Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/
standcomm/sclaw/StateMedliablitylaws2007.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
141. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 140.
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of the limitation on pain and suffering damages to control for
excessive jury verdicts. This is one option for the State.
In addition to distinguishing between types of damages, several
states have passed creative methods for ensuring that limitations on
liability keep pace with current economic conditions and prices.
Four of these statutory options are listed and discussed below,
some with continuing reservations about equal protection issues.
A. Adjustments Based on Inflation and the Consumer Price Index
Inflation, very simply, is an economic condition where prices
continue to rise year after year. 142 The inflation rate is calculated as
a percentage of the increase change over the course of a number of
years. 143 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is an indicator of
aggregate price levels, measured by comparing prices from a
sampling of goods and services yearly.144 As representative of
changing prices, CPI is often used as a calculator for inflation.
Additionally, as a practical matter, CPI is also readily available;
the indicator is published by the Department of Labor Bureau of
Labor Statistics with monthly updates. 145 States can easily
calculate the change in their limitation by using the year of
enactment--or any year they choose-as the base and multiply by
the indicator appropriate for the number of years necessary. 14
West Virginia caps noneconomic damages at $250,000. 1 The
statute accounts for inflation using the CPI with 2004 as its base
year. 47 Arkansas caps punitive damages at $250,000 or three times
the awarded compensatory damages, not to exceed $1,000,000.1 48
It applied adjustments beginning January 1, 2006, at planned three-
year intervals based on the CPI, and allowed for oversight by its
Administrative Office of the Courts. 149 Michigan also applies the
CPI to its noneconomic damages cap, as adjusted by its state
treasurer. 
150
Statutes cite to the Department of Labor or the Administrative
Office of the Courts", as common sources for the indicator. 152
142. MISHKIN, supra note 118.
143. Id. at 11.
144. Id. at 21.
145. See generally U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
146. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8(a) (West Supp. 2008).
147. See § 55-7B-8(c).
148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208(a) (Supp. 2005).
149. See § 16-55-208(c).
150. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483(4) (West 1996).
151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208(c).
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This change would be easily manageable for Louisiana. By
amending the existing statute, the Legislature could add language
to establish a base year and a time period for adjustments.
Additionally, the State could use the same United States multiplier
as the other states.
Application an economic indicator for inflation would involve
multiplying the given percentage of inflation for each year. The
Michigan statute gives authority to the state treasurer to adjust the
limitation annually.'53 Louisiana could similarly amend the cap
statute, section 40:1299.42, by giving this power to the state
treasurer. This amendment would allow the cap to incrementally
increase each year with inflation. That multiplier alone would take
into account the real value of money, a consideration in wages,
costs, and prices.
B. Adjustments Based on Wages
Idaho establishes an increase/decrease factor based on the
State's average wage; the State enacted a $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages. 154 Beginning July 1, 2004, the cap changed
according to the Idaho Industrial Commissions percentage
adjustments to the average wage computation.' 55 The State is
essentially trying to calculate its own local price index by making
changes in state wages from year-to-year. The Idaho wage
determination is made by a state commission that considers weekly
wages as reported by local employers for each calendar week in
the year.'5
6
This method necessarily employs a local approach. If the
legislature chose to make the adjustments so specific to Louisiana,
there would be several practical issues. Based on the reporting
requirement, the State would have to select a means by which to
gather weekly income data for the year, process the information,
publish an average, and calculate the average percentage change
using the chosen base year. The process does account for state
wages, though, which would provide an indicator for increases
similar to the use of an indicator such as the CPI.
152. Id.; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8(c).
153. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483(4).
154. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603(1) (2006).
155. Id.
156. § 72-409(2).
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C. Adjustments Based on Victim 's Life Expectancy
Alaska takes a unique approach to noneconomic damages.
When damages are awarded for a serious injury, defined as "severe
permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement," the cap
on noneconomic damages may not exceed $1,000,000 or the
victim's life expectancy (in years) multiplied by $25,000,
whichever is greater. 157 Noneconomic damages arising from death
or an injury not included in the severe category have a cap of
$400,000 or the victim's life expectancy (in years) multiplied by
$8,000, whichever is greater.158
The intent of this statute is clearly to value the remaining life of
a victim who must continue with a catastrophic injury. Arguably,
as the victim's annual salary increases, the statute would not
provide above a certain income level. This general cap provides for
the liability protection the Louisiana legislature considered for the
State's Medical Malpractice Act, but a life expectancy multiplier
allows for a case-by-case determination based on the extent of a
victim's injury. Life expectancy estimates would likely require
expert testimony and additional court resources for a jury or trial
court. 1
59
Washington adopted a mixed approach to life expectancy and
wage calculations in its limitation on noneconomic damages. A
plaintiff may not recover noneconomic damages greater than 0.43
multiplied by the average annual wage and the life expectancy of
the victim. 16 Additionally, the victim's life expectancy cannot be
valued at less than fifteen years. 16 1 The cap is determined on a
completely individualized basis. The statute has similar potential
legislative concerns as several of the above options because it
depends on wage reporting, internal state calculation, and
interpretation of expert testimony by the court. 162
D. Flat $15, 000 Increase Annually
Maryland also has a noneconomic damages cap set at $650,000
for actions arising from January 1, 2005, through December 31,
2008.163 Beginning January 1, 2009, however, the statute has a flat
157. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(c) (2006).
158. See § 09.17.010(b).
159. See generally LA. CODE EViD. art. 702 (2006).
160. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250(2) (West 2006).
161. Id.
162. See generally LA. CODE EViD. art. 702.
163. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PRoc. § 3-2A-09(b)(1)(i) (West 2002).
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$15,000 increase each year.64 A flat increase would be one of the
easiest plans to implement. It would only require an amendment to
the Louisiana statute and simple addition by the trial court. A small
consideration could be the actual inflation rate and the concern
that, given future economic conditions, $15,000 might not be
sufficient to account for increasing prices or adequate control for a
stabilization or plateau in the inflation rate.
E. Inflation Adjustment (CPI) Should be Utilized to Adjust the Cap
The State of Louisiana already employs an inflation adjuster, as
determined by the CPI, in several other areas governed by the
Louisiana Revised Statutes.' 65 Since the State already employs
such an adjuster for financing pensions, determining oil and gas
revenues, public contracts limits and providing a tax credit for
child care directors and staff,166 the State could use the same
mechanism to annually adjust the medical malpractice cap.
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:302 expressly delegates the
adjustment task to the state treasurer. 167 The State has models for
implementation and a method by which an inflation indicator is
already utilized by state agencies. A practical solution would be to
amend Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42 to provide
for the inflation multiplier.
IV. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act
is not merely an academic topic left to the likes of law reviews and
scholarly speculation; the issue is more than likely to reappear in
Louisiana courts. Indeed, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal vacated its judgment in Taylor v. Clement on July 6 2007,
and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions. r68 The
issue is returning to the trial court to fix the procedural issues upon
which the Louisiana Supreme Court focused when it avoided the
constitutionality question. Procedural problems solved, the case
will undoubtedly cycle back to the supreme court. Without an
amendment to the current statute by the Louisiana legislature, the
164. See § 3-2A-09(b)(1)(ii).
165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:2227(D)(5) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30:302 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2212(A)(1)(d)(iii) (2005); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 47:6106(C) (Supp. 2008).
166. Id.
167. See. § 30:302.
168. Taylor v. Clement, 970 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 969
So. 2d 630 (La. 2007).
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court will examine these constitutionality issues under article 1,
sections 3 and 22. The "imperfect" balance for medical malpractice
victims is broken, and it's up to the legislature or, ultimately, the
Louisiana Supreme Court to fix it. 169
Allison B. Lewis*
169. During the 2008 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature,
Representative John Bel Edwards introduced House Bill No. 664, a proposal to
amend Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42 on the limitation of recovery. The
amendment included an adjustment for the limit based upon the national
Consumer Price Index, with no adjustment (increase or decrease) totaling more
than 4%. The bill included a procedural subsection whereby the adjustment
would be made on October 1 of each year beginning in 2010. The bill was
assigned to the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee, but no further
action was taken.
* The author wishes to thank Professor John M. Church for his invaluable
assistance and guidance during the drafting of this Comment. Also, many thanks
to Tom and Carol Lewis, and Charlie Reeves for their support, patience, and
countless edits.
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